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On August 20, 1998, the United States fired Tomahawk missiles at sites
in Afghanistan and Sudan. The missile strikes destroyed the El Shifa
pharmaceutical plant located in Sudan's capital, Khartoum. The United States
also targeted training facilities in Afghanistan believed to be under the control
of Osama bin Laden, the man depicted by the Clinton Administration as the
"terrorist mastermind" behind the August 7, 1998 bombings of the American
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salam, Tanzania.
The United States promptly notified the Security Council that the
military strikes were legally justified as measures taken in self-defense, under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.! President Clinton stated that the
United States had "convincing evidence" that bin Laden was behind the
embassy bombings and had planned to attack other American targets in the
immediate future.2 Administration officials claimed that the Sudan factory
"was producing chemical warfare-related weapons" and was linked to bin
Laden's terrorist network.
3
The Security Council did not meet publicly to evaluate the U.S. military
action, as it did in 1986 and 1993 when the United States launched air strikes
in response to the alleged terrorist acts and plots of Libya and Iraq.4 Thus far,
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1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; U.S. Strikes Back NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 21, 1998, at
A38.
2. See Art Pine, US. Targets Heart of Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21,1998, at Al.
3. White House Special Briefing with Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser, Fed. News
Serv., Aug. 21, 1998, at 1.
4. See Albright Takes Case to UN., STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 28, 1993, at Al;
Michael I. Berlin, Raid on Libya Condemned by U.N. General Assembly, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1986,
at A30 (noting that the United States had blocked a Security Council resolution condemning the raid
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the United States has successfully blocked Sudan's efforts to initiate a
Security Council fact-finding investigation of the U.S. claim that the El Shifa
plant had produced a precursor of lethal VX gas.
5
International reaction to the U.S. action was mixed and muted. Most
U.S. allies, including Britain, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel,
67supported the attacks. France and Italy issued tepid statements of support.7
Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned the attacks, as did Pakistan and
several Arab countries.8 China, although equivocal at first, later openly
criticized the U.S. action.9 The Non-Aligned Movement condemned the U.S.
attack as "unilateral and unwarranted."' Finally, in September, U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan criticized "individual actions" against
terrorism, implying his disapproval of the August 20 missile strikes."I
The missile strikes on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan renew the
important legal question regarding a nation's right to use force in response to
a terrorist attack pursuant to Article 51, an issue that has been extensively
debated if legal journals since the 1980s. Yet the August 20 missile strikes
raise the equally important but far less analyzed, questions of how, and under
what evidentiary standard, nations and scholars are to assess the factual
allegations upon which the use of force against terrorism is premised.
Questions involving the standards and mechanisms for assessing
complicated factual inquiries are generally not accorded the same treatment
given by the legal academy to the more abstract issues involved in defining
relevant international law standards. Unfortunately, international incidents
generally involve disputed issues of fact and in the absence of an
international judicial or other centralized fact-finding mechanism, the ad hoe
manner in which nations evaluate factual claims is often decisive. At the heart
of the questions surrounding the August 20 missile strikes-particularly in the
case of Sudan-is the credibility of the U.S. assertions of fact. The U.S.
government's factual assertions were openly challenged by Sudan and
questioned by the U.S. press, some Administration officials, and other
countries. The August 20 missile strikes thus raise the following questions:
some months earlier).
5. Both the U.N. Arab Group and the Organization for African Unity supported Sudan's
request for an investigation. See Draft U.N. Resolution Calls for Sudan Fact-finding Mission, Agence
Fr.-Presse, Sept. 28, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File; OAUDemands U.N. Inquiry
into U.S. Bombing in Sudan, Agence Fr.-Presse, Sept. 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allaws File.
6. See Ui Pan & Tracy Conner, Ignored Boris Goes Ballistic, N.Y. POsT, Aug. 22, 1998, at
A5.
7. See id.
8. See Allies Back U.S. Strikes; Russia Among the Dissenters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRiB.,
Aug. 22, 1998, at 6A; Daniel Deane, Pakistan to Lodge Complaint About U.S., USA TODAY, Aug. 25,
1998, at A4.
9. See Frank Ching, China Feels Let Down by US., FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 24, 1998, at
38.
10. Id.
11. See Annan Faults States' "Individual Actions" Against Terrorism, Agence Fr.-Presse,
Sept. 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
The Use of Force
1. Is a country that unilaterally uses force required to submit the proof upon
which it relies to some international forum?
2. What degree of factual certainty ought a nation have before it can attack
another nation?
3. What are the implications for international law of permitting a nation to
unilaterally use force based on its self-described factual claims where: (a)
the state makes its own unilateral characterization of the facts; (b) there is
no court or other centralized authority to evaluate those claims; and (c) the
evidence is secret and cannot be compelled?
The changing nature of warfare in the latter half of the twentieth century
highlights the international community's need to develop rules and
mechanisms to address the factual assertions upon which a nation employs
armed force. The U.N. Charter-based rules were designed for a world where
warfare primarily involved the large scale attack by one nation against the
territory of another, as occurred in World War I and World War II. The rise of
internal conflict and of private non-state actors in post-World War II conflict
12
raises questions not only about the legal definitions of armed attack and self-
defense, but also the factual premises such warfare involves. Claims that a
nation has unlawfully and covertly intervened on behalf of one side in a civil
war, or has secretly aided a terrorist organization in launching its attacks, raise
complex factual issues that are often not present where one nation openly
attacks another. Modem warfare thus calls for increased attention to the fact-
finding and evaluating standards and mechanisms employed by the
international community and nation-states. This Comment will address these
questions. I argue that international law cannot allow a nation to attack
another based on a self-serving, unilateral characterization of facts not subject
to multilateral investigation. Any contrary rule renders the U.N. Charter's
proscription of the non-defensive unilateral use of force a nullity.
Part II examines the traditional and revisionist interpretations of the
Charter's rules on the use of force and the application of these rules to the
problem of using force in response to terrorist attacks. Part III analyzes the
factual claims the United States made in legally justifying the August 20
missile attacks, focusing particularly on the attack on Sudan. I conclude that
the most troubling aspect of those attacks was not the legal rules the Clinton
Administration asserted, but the' manner in which it treated the factual
premises underlying its legal justification. Part IV argues that it is necessary
for nations to employ a higher evidentiary standard than that used by the
United States to attack Sudan before a state responds to a purported terrorist
attack with force. It also challenges the United States's assertion that
multilateral fact-finding and review are unessential to render a forceful
12. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and
Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 51-52 (1983)
(discussing the rise of civil wars and private armies); W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global
War System: Prologue to Decision, in LAW AND CONTEMPORARY WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 242 (J.
Moore ed., 1974) (same).
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response to a terrorist attack lawful. My general claim is that any relaxation or
redefinition of the U.N. Charter's legal rules to address the problem of
terrorism must be accompanied by greater international scrutiny of the factual
basis of forceful responses to terrorism. Part V questions the alleged military
and political efficacy of armed responses to terrorism. Part VI concludes that
the international community's failure to seriously protest the August 20
missile attacks does not reflect the emergence of any new legal principle or
expansion of self-defense permitted by Article 51, but rather an acquiescence
to the power of the world's sole remaining superpower.
II. THE LEGAL STANDARDS
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force except when
authorized by the Security Council or when undertaken by individual nations
in self-defense and in response to "an armed attack., 13 Moreover, as a general
matter, the United Nations has sought to limit the Article 51 self-defense
exception to prevent its misuse. First, Article 51 permits only those actions
taken in self-defense; reprisals and retaliations are proscribed under the U.N.
Charter.14 In other words, a nation can respond to an ongoing attack, including
one waged by a terrorist organization, by using force.' However, that nation
may not forcibly retaliate against another in response to an unlawful act that
the latter committed against the former in the past. The reasoning behind this
rule is simple: a nation subject to an ongoing attack cannot be expected to wait
for the international community's aid before fighting back. Obviously, when a
nation is under attack, immediate action is necessary. On the other hand, a
nation whose citizens are no longer being attacked must seek U.N.
intervention; to allow military reprisals would be to encourage the renewed
use of force. This would result in a spiraling escalation of violence. Thus, the
U.S. government, most state actors, the U.N. Security Council, and the
International Court of Justice have officially taken the position that armed
reprisals are outlawed.16
A second limitation on the self-defense exception is that not all uses of
force qualify as "armed" attacks. As the International Court of Justice
13. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51.
14. See D. BowErT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (1958); IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 281-83 (1963); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS 174-76 (1948); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1620 (1984). But see ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES 35-44 (1984)
(considering a more expansive view of the scope of the self-defense exception).
15. See Anthony C. Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1990) (referring to the "typical action taken in self-defense" as
one in which the state must immediately act to protect itself from an ongoing attack); Jeffrey C.
Tuomala, Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-18 (1994) (describing
the U.N. standard for self-defense).
16. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 188, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 188th Mtg., U.N. Doc. A15751 (1964);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 905 (1987); W.
MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 93, 101-02 (1992).
The Use of Force
concluded in Nicaragua v. United States, only a substantial military attack,
and not isolated armed incidents, rises to the level of an "armed attack."'
17
Third, not all aid provided by a state to terrorists will render that state
complicit in an armed attack carried out by those terrorists. The court in the
Nicaragua case determined that although the provision of arms or other forms
of aid by one government to guerrillas could be considered an unlawful use of
force, it would not necessarily constitute an "armed attack" upon the other.18
This would suggest that a government could not launch counterattacks against
terrorist bases in another state unless the terrorists were agents of the state or
were controlled by its government. The court, in dicta, suggested that the
attacked state-though not its allies--could take proportionate and necessary
countermeasures. 19
Finally, governments cannot lawfully use force to respond to terrorist
threats that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, at least unless those
threats are widespread and imminent.20 The Charter thus seems to preclude
any open-ended use of anticipatory self-defense; the unanimous Security
Council condemnation of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at
Osrig reinforces this proscription.2'
Despite this traditional, restrictive scheme designed to narrowly limit a
nation's right to use force in self-defense, various scholars have argued for a
more expansive view of a nation's military options in fighting terrorism. 22 The
driving force behind that argument is the perceived political and military
desirability of employing force against terrorists. Former Legal Advisor to the
State Department Abraham Sofaer has argued that "[s]elf-defense allows a
proportionate response to every use of force, not just 'armed attacks.'
2 3
Sofaer also claims that any aid given by a state to terrorists-for instance,
allowing terrorist groups to use its territory-renders that state complicit and
subject to attack.24 Finally, Sofaer argues that "[d]efensive measures may be
taken to pre-empt attacks, as in Sudan, where necessary for deterrence.' 25
Thus, a nation suspecting that a terrorist group is planning future, unspecified
attacks against it would be justified in using military force against that group
and any country knowingly harboring it.
17. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 1, 93-99 (June 27).
18. See id. at 93-94.
19. See id. at 117. The court did not articulate whether those countermeasures could include
the use of force.
20. See Schachter, supra note 14, at 1633-34.
21. See S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 487thmtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF 37 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Louis R. Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, "Palestine, " and Anticipatory
Self-Defense, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992); Abraham D. Sofaer, Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Soif
Lecture in International Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89 (1989);
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE. J. INT'L L. 559,
560 (1999) ("[1]t remains to be seen whether . . . [the Charter's] textual rules and community
understandings will allow an effective response to the problem of terrorism.").
23. Abraham D. Sofaer, US. Acted Legally in Foreign Raids, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 19,
1998, at A29; see also Sofaer, supra note 22, at 92 (advocating the same proposition).
24. See Sofaer, supra note 22, at 98-99, 108.
25. Sofaer, supra note 23.
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Although Sofaer's viewpoint is not the publicly articulated policy of
many nation-states, some have argued that, as a practical matter,
governmental elites tolerate forceful reprisals despite the formal strictures of
the U.N. Charter. Professor Michael Reisman uses the U.S. missile raid on
Baghdad in 1993 to illustrate this point. Reisman notes that while the United
States sought to characterize the raid (in response to the alleged assassination
attempt on President Bush) "as an act of self-defense, the raid fits at least as
comfortably, if not more so, under the classic rubric of reprisal., 26 He claims
that this practice of characterizing military actions as lawful exercises of self-
defense, when factually they are reprisals, illustrates an emerging code that
implicitly accepts the use of forceful countermeasures.Y His broader claim,
adopted by some like-minded scholars, is that whatever the justification
employed, nations such as the United States are in practice maintaining the
option to use force unilaterally in a wider set of circumstances than those
suggested by the narrow strictures of Article 51.
Those who argue for the broad right of states to use force unilaterally
against terrorists point to the world community's normative value of deterring,
eradicating, or at least reducing terrorism. Nevertheless, the Charter's
restriction of such uses of force to pure self-defensive measures serves several
values equally critical to a peaceful world community and a just international
order. First, it ensures that force is used only as an emergency measure, a
necessary last resort. The Charter value of peaceful dispute resolution rejects
the use of military might to enforce a nation's claims unless, of course, the
nation is itself subject to an ongoing armed attack and must immediately
respond with force. The alternative would be an anarchic escalation of
violence in which any nation could unilaterally employ military force to
punish a wrongdoer. For example, such a regime would allow Holland to
attack France for blowing up the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 and killing Dutch
citizens. Cuba could attack the United States in response to its attempts to
assassinate Fidel Castro. Libya could retaliate for the U.S. attempt on
Muammar al-Qaddafi's life in 1986.
Second, the Article 51 requirement of an ongoing armed attack serves as
a restraint against uses of force based on pretext, misunderstanding, and
erroneous factual determinations. In other words, that requirement serves as
an evidentiary standard proscribing the use of force in situations where both
the threat to national security and the source of that threat is less than clear,
limiting the authorized use of force to a class of situations in which there is a
relatively easily verifiable factual predicate for the use of retaliatory force. As
Professor Henkin has noted, the United Nations "recognize[s] the exception of
self-defense in emergency, but limit[s] [it] to actual armed attack, which is
clear, unambiguous, subject to proof, and not easily open to misinterpretation
or fabrication."
28
26. W. Michael Reisman, Self-Defence or Reprisals? The Raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections
on Its Lawfulness and Implications, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 120, 125 (1994).
27. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 16, at 102.
28. LOUIS HENKIN, HOWNAnONS BEHAVE 142 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
The Use of Force
When one nation attacks another, the factual predicate for self-defense is
clear and observable. That is usually not the case where a nation claims the
right to use force in response to alleged terrorist attacks and imminent threats
thereof. It is untenable for international law to permit one nation to attack
another merely because it alone claims that a group operating in the other
country is launching terrorist attacks against it. Such a rule would obliterate
the prohibition against the use of force, as unsubstantiated claims by a single
state would become the new legal predicate for the use of force. Those who
urge a looser interpretation of Article 51 have yet to prescribe a viable method
of ensuring that self-serving characterizations of facts are subject to some
clear legal standard and international oversight. The August 20 missile attacks
on Afghanistan and Sudan highlight this problem.
Im. THE FACTUAL PREDICATES OF THE AUGUST 20 ATTACKS
The Clinton Administration sought to justify the August 20 missile
strikes as self-defense in response to an armed attack under Article 5 1.29 If one
accepts the Administration's factual claims-that bin Laden's network was
responsible for the embassy bombings and other prior bombings, that bin
Laden had publicly issued a fatwa calling for more attacks on American
civilian and military targets, and that the Administration had evidence that he
was indeed planning further attacks30-- one could conclude that bin Laden was
engaged in an ongoing armed attack against the United States. 31 The
Administration's assertions of fact, if true, could thus give rise to a right of
self-defense. Such a right would permit the United States to take necessary
and proportionate countermeasures, including the use of force to prevent such
future attacks.32
The Sudan attack is legally more difficult to justify, even assuming the
Administration's facts to be true. The United States has not claimed that bin
Laden used chemical weapons, or that he was going to use them imminently,
29. In some cases, the legal standard used to determine whether a use of force against
terrorists is permissible will be dispositive..For example, the 1993 U.S. raid against Baghdad could not
plausibly fit within the classical rubric of self-defense, even accepting the facts proffered by the United
States. See Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Bombing Baghdad: Illegal Reprisal or Self-Defense?, LEGAL
TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 24. Rather, the raid is best characterized as a reprisal. However, the U.S.
government's factual allegations, if true, could justify the 1998 Afghanistan and Sudan bombings even
under a restrictive legal standard.
30. See Bradley Graham, Bin Laden Was at Camp Just Before US. Attack, WASH. POST,
Aug. 29, 1998, at Al.
31. The United States also alleges that Afghanistan is unwilling or unable to prevent bin
Laden's attacks. This claim raises the disputed legal issue of whetier one state may attack another where
the latter state is not sponsoring state terrorism, but merely unable to prevent terrorists from operating
within its territory. This Comment will not address that problem. Rather, I assume that a state has a right
to use proportionate force against terrorists operating within a state that cannot and will not act against
those terrorists.
32. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 1, 93, 109 (June 27). However, the United States would not have the right to launch missiles
through Pakistani air space, as it apparently did on August 20. See U.N. Puts Off Airspace Violation
Discmsions, PERISCOPE DAILY DEF. NEws CAPSULES, Aug. 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
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or that the El Shifa factory was producing chemical weapons. Moreover, the
United States has historically rejected a broad right of anticipatory self-
defense: "In contrast to an attack on a terrorist base in self defense, the United
States opposes peacetime attacks on a state's facilities on the mere possibility
that they may someday be used against the attacking country."33 The Clinton
Administration cannot rely on the theory of anticipatory self-defense to justify
the missile attack on the factory.
The Administration thus attempted to set forth a justification of self-
defense that was not based on anticipatory self-defense. It claimed that the
factory was linked to or controlled by bin Laden's network, that it was
producing nerve gas precursors, and that bin Laden was engaged in a
systematic terror campaign against the United States. If these propositions
could be proven, the United States could conceivably justify the attack as one
targeting an instrumentality of bin Laden's terror network that, in turn, was
engaged in an armed attack against the United States. The main problem with
the Clinton Administration's argument is not its theory of self-defense per se,
but rather its faulty factual premises.
The attack on the El Shifa factory was predicated upon three critical
assertions of fact. First, the Administration claimed that the plant did not
produce any medicines and was a heavily guarded chemical weapons
facility.34 After the attack, officials quickly backed away from that claim,
acknowledging that at the time of the missile strikes they were unaware that
the factory did in fact produce pharmaceuticals and that it was unguarded.
Indeed, it subsequently became clear that the El Shifa plant was the major
pharmaceutical producer in Sudan and was visited routinely by foreign
dignitaries, school children, visiting Americans, and representatives of the
36World Health Organization.
Second, Secretary of Defense William Cohen claimed that bin Laden
had a clear financial interest in the El Shifa plant. As it turned out, the
Administration did not know that Salah Idris, a Sudanese businessman with no
obvious ties to bin Laden, had purchased the plant several months before the
33. Sofaer, supra note 22, at 109.
34. See Terry Atlas & Ray Moseley, 'Smoking Gun 'for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 28, 1998, at 1; Colum Lynch, Sudan Working for Better Ties with U.S., BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 7, 1998, at A8; Betsy Pisik, Pakistan Files Complaint over Attack, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at
Al; Sudanese Factory Was Working with Iraq on VX Nerve Agent, U.S. Intelligence Says, BALTIMORE
SuN, Aug. 26, 1998, at 18A.
35. See Embassy Bombing Suspects Charged in US; Ties to Saudi Exile Asserted; Other
Developments, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Sept. 3, 1998, at 608; Seymour M. Hersh, The
Missiles ofAugust, NEw YORKER, Oct. 12, 1998, at 34, 40; Tim Weiner & Steven Lee Myers, After the
Attacks: The Overview; Flaws in US. Account Raise Questions on Strike in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 1998, at Al; Tim Weiner & Steven Lee Myers, US. Notes Gaps in Data About Drug Plant but
Defends Attack N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at A6.
36. See Bashir Calls for UN. Probe: Claims Raid Launched from Arab State, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, Aug. 20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Tom Hundley, In
Sudan, U.S. Replaces Regime as the Villain, CI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1998, at 1; John Parker, Bombing of
Sudanese Plant a Violation of International Law, CHI. INDEP. BULL., Oct. 8, 1998, at 11; Sudan Target
Made Only Pharmaceuticals, Agence Fr.-Presse, Aug. 29, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File.
attack.3 7 While the Administration has subsequently attempted to tie Idris to
bin Laden, any connection remains highly speculative.
38
The Administration -proffered a third factual argument, supposedly the
"smoking gun," to make itsase: A soil sample collected from the ground
outside the factory was found to contain the chemical EMPTA. Officials have
stated that EMPTA's only known use was as a precursor ingredient in the
nerve gas VX. That evidence, however, has been called into question.
While the U.S. claimed that EMPTA is an immediate chemical weapons
precursor with no recognized chemical use, several subsequent reports dispute
that claim. First, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), the international group overseeing the treaty prohibiting chemical
weapons, lists EMPTA as having possible commercial uses; other independent
experts similarly concluded that EMPTA could have lawful applications.
39
Moreover, some experts suggested that EMPTA's chemical structure
resembled that of an agricultural insecticide known -as FONDOS, and that a
laboratory test could confuse the two.
40
Questions have also arisen about the soil sample itself. Intelligence
reports on Sudan are notoriously suspect. In fact, the United States admits it
withdrew over one hundred intelligence reports on Sudan because there were
reasons to believe they were fabricated.41 The soil sample could have been
similarly fabricated. A senior OPCW inspector familiar with EMPTA
explained that due to the chemical's highly reactive nature, it is unlikely that
unaltered EMPTA could be found in a ground sample. The inspector argued,
"The only way this material could be in the ground is if somebody had
emptied a flask.., and then taken a sample., 42 Moreover, a team of scientists
was hired by a prominent Washington law firm with ties to the Democratic
Party to determine whether EMPTA was present on the factory grounds. The
scientists conducted an extensive analysis and concluded that "to the practical
limits of scientific detection, there was no Empta or Empa" in the plant's
breakdown product.
43
37. See Daniel Pearl, In Sudanese Bombing, 'Evidence'Depends on Who Is Viewing It, WALL
ST- J., Oct. 28, 1998, at Al. When asked how they "knew" that the plant was run by the Sudanese
government's weapons-making arm in which bin Laden purportedly has an interest, a U.S. intelligence
official said that they assumed that any chemical weapons plant in Sudan would be run by the
government. See id.; Paul Richter, Sudan Attack Claims Faulty, U.S. Admits, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998,
at Al.
38. See Atlas & Moseley, supra note 34. U.S. officials now claim that Mr. Idris is a protbg6 of
the chairman of the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, whose sister is married to bin Laden.
See Pearl, supra note 37, at Al.
39. See Atlas & Moseley, supra note 34; Hassan Ibrahim et al., The Missiles, the Bungling
Pentagon and the Nerve Gas Factory That Never Was, THE MIDDLE E. OBSERVER, Aug. 30, 1998, at 4;
Daniel Pearl, More Doubts Rise Over Claims for U.S. Attack WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1998, at AS.
40. See Chemical Cited in US. Attack Could Have Use Commercially, BALTIMORE SUN,
Aug. 27, 1998, at 21A; Steven Lee Myers & Tim Weiner, After the Attack: The Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1998, at Al.
41. See Tim Weiner & James Risen, Strike on Sudan Plant: A Growing Case of Doubyful
Intelligence, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 22, 1998, at 7.
42. Hersh, supra note 35, at 40.
43. James Risen & David Johnston, Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A3. The team was headed by the chairman of the chemistry
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As for the purported link between Salah Idris, the factory's owner, and
bin Laden, an international security company hired by Mr. Idris's Washington
lawyers found no evidence of any direct link between the two.44 The White
House, however, was not persuaded by any of this new evidence.
45
Other reports also contradicted the American assertion that the El Shifa
plant was a chemical weapons factory. An American engineer who designed
the factory claimed that it was designed solely for producing pharmaceuticals
and did not have the facilities or equipment for making nerve gas.46 Several
Jordanian engineers and a British engineer who was the technical manager at
the plant concurred, as did the German ambassador to Sudan and the Italian
supplier of the factory.47 Even some Administration officials realized that the
evidence was unconvincing, 48 as have officials from nations closely allied to
the United States.
49
Despite this host of questions, the United States has consistently stood
by its version of the facts and rebuffed requests from Sudan and other
countries for a Security Council investigation. American officials have
responded to such questions by claiming that there was irrefutable evidence
that the plant was producing EMIPTA.50
While the administration sees no reason for an independent
investigation, some Americans, including former President Jimmy Carter,
support such measures. 51 Even Abraham Sofaer, former Legal Advisor to
President Reagan, wrote that it is "disturbing ... that the defense secretary
announced (on the basis of erroneous intelligence) that the factory in Sudan
did not make pharmaceuticals, and that the Clinton Administration has been
unwilling to participate in a thorough evaluation of its factual premises
concerning the plant."
52
The Sudan missile strike thus highlights the fundamental dilemma of the
claimed right of nations to use force unilaterally against terrorists. Who
department of Boston University. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Ibrahim et al., supra note 39; Pearl, supra note 37.
47. See Ibrahim et al., supra note 39; Vernon Loeb, Employees Dispute Charge That Plant
Made Nerve Agent, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, at A15.
48. See Tim Weiner & James Risen, Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise
Inferredfrom Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at Al.
49. See Colum Lynch, Allied Doubts Grow About U.S. Strike on Sudanese Plant, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1998, at A2 (noting assertions by French and Italian foreign ministers, as well as
British and German officials, that the evidence is less than convincing). Senior British officials
reportedly have privately expressed "dismay and anger" over the missile strikes. See id.; see also Carter
Urges Inquiry Into U.S. Raid on Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at A4 (noting the assertion of
former President Carter that British, German, and other foreign leaders "were increasingly skeptical of
American assertions about the [Sudan] factory").
50. See Steven Lee Myers, After the Attacks: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, at
Al.
51. See Carter Urges Inquiry Into U.S. Raid on Sudan, supra note 49. Both the New York
Times and the Washington Post editorialized that the doubts about the Administration's evidence
regarding the El Shifa factory required further investigation. See Editorial, Eliminating Hidden
Weapons: Too Much Secrecy on the Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at A24; Editorial, Intelligence
Lapse?, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1998, at C6.
52. Sofaer, supra note 23.
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determines the scope of responsibility for a terrorist attack, using what kind of
evidentiary standard, and subject to what international oversight? The United
States government's position on the destruction of the El Shifa factory is that
it alone can characterize and review the facts without multilateral or
independent review by other member nations of the United Nations.
International investigation is unnecessary because the U.S. believes that "we
have credible information" justifying the strikes, even if much of the world
disagrees. The U.S. action is subject to the same criticism set forth by
Professor Henkin in his discussion of the Baghdad raid of 1993; it is "a
unilateral action by a state on its own decision, on the basis of its own findings
of undisclosed facts, of its own characterization of those facts, and its own
interpretation of applicable legal principle."
53
The U.N. Charter requirement that self-defense be used solely to counter
an ongoing armed attack reflects an evidentiary presumption that a nation may
use force only when the facts it relies on are clear and unambiguous. A regime
which, as a practical matter, allows the recent missile strikes against Sudan
reverses this evidentiary presumption. If nations are permitted to launch
unilateral attacks based on secret information gained largely by inference,
processed by and known only to a few individuals and not subject to
international review, then Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is rendered virtually
meaningless.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
A. The Evidentiary Threshold
Given the potential for abuse of the right of national self-defense,
international law must require that a nation meet a clear and stringent
evidentiary standard designed to assure the world community that an ongoing
terrorist attack is in fact occurring before the attacked nation responds with
force. Such a principle is the clear import of the International Court of
Justice's decision in Nicaragua v. United States. From this decision, it can be
discerned that a military response to a terrorist attack should at a minimum
require: (1) that the nation carefully evaluate the evidence to ensure a high
degree of certainty that it has identified those responsible for an attack and
that more attacks are imminent; (2) that the facts relied upon be made public;
and (3) that the facts are subject to international scrutiny and investigation.
None of these three requirements were met in the missile attacks on Sudan
and Afghanistan.
United States officials have for some years urged that the requirement of
reaching reasonable factual certainty before force is employed be discarded or
watered down in the context of fighting against terrorism. Secretary of State
George Schultz argued in 1984 that the United States must be ready to use
military force to fight terrorism and retaliate for terrorist attacks even before
53. Notes From the President, ASIL NEwSL., June 1993, at 2.
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all the facts are known.54 Similarly, Abraham Sofaer has claimed that in the
interest of national security, the United States must use force when responding
to terrorism even if our claims cannot "be proved in a real court or in the court
of public opinion."55 While the Charter regime attempts to limit the unilateral
use of military power to cases of clear self-defense, Schultz argued that "we
do not have the luxury of waiting until all the ambiguities have
disappeared.,
56
The Clinton Administration, following in the footsteps of the Reagan
White House, has evinced a consistent disregard for evidentiary showings,
preferring to "act now and talk later." In 1993, when the Kuwaiti government
allegedly uncovered an Iraqi plot to assassinate President Bush, President
Clinton announced that the United States would postpone any response until
the facts were established in the criminal trials in Kuwait City.57 Nonetheless,
before those trials ended, U.S. warships fired twenty-three Tomahawk cruise
missiles at Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.58
The Sudan and Afghanistan attacks reflect a similar willingness to use
military might before the facts have been established. Attorney General Janet
Reno was reportedly disturbed that the Administration had not accumulated
clear evidence of a link between bin Laden and the projected targets.
59
Furthermore, the attacks on bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan were
undertaken while the FBI investigation was still in its preliminary stage.
60
Indeed, Reno apparently urged the White House to delay the raids so that the
FBI could gather more evidence linking bin Laden to the embassy bombings.
Seymour Hersh has reported that Justice Department officials say they
understood that Reno warned the White House that it was not clear, based on
the information then available, that the United States had enough evidence
against bin Laden to meet the standards of international law.61 The attack on
Afghanistan and Sudan reflects an even more watered-down factual standard
than that employed by the Reagan Administration. As a Justice Department
official explained, the Attorney General believed that the evidence tying bin
Laden to the embassy bombing did not meet the Tripoli standard-a reference
to the 1986 air strike against Libya.
-62
54. See Excerpts from Schultz's Address on International Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1984, at A12.
55. Sofaer, supra note 22, at 105.
56. George Schultz, Low Intensity Warfare, the Challenge of Ambiguity, 25 I.L.M. 204, 205
(1986).
57. See Reisman, supra note 26, at 120-21; U.S. Delays Any Revenge Against Iraq, CHI.
TRIB., June 8, 1993, at 9.
58. U.S. officials did conduct what they described as an extensive investigation into the
alleged plot. See Official Recounts Probe oflraqi Plot, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 29, 1993, at 1A.
59. See Hersh, supra note 35, at 36.
60. See FBI Director Says Investigation Into Bombings Is Preliminary, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug.
22, 1998, at 98 (noting FBI Director Freeh's declaration that he had come to "no final conclusions"
about who was responsible for the embassy bombing).
61. See Hersh, supra note 35, at 36.
62. See id. at 38.
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Thirteen years ago, after it had ordered the raid on Tripoli, the Reagan
Administration proffered the following evidence to the U.N. Security Council
in attempting to justify the attack as a measure taken in self-defense:
1. Cable intercepts of messages between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in
Berlin that allegedly ordered the bombing in West Berlin that killed a U.S.
Army sergeant and injured fifty American military personnel;
2. A series of alleged terrorist incidents occurring within a week of the West
Berlin bombing, planned or committed by Libyan agents who were
arrested or expelled by police in Istanbul and officials in Paris; and
3. Evidence that the Libyan embassy in Vienna was in the process of plotting
a terrorist operation against an unknown target on April 17, 1986, and that
Libya was planning widespread attacks against Americans in the following
weeks.63
Notwithstanding this alleged evidence, world reaction generally condemned
the U.S. raid. The Security Council voted nine to five to condemn the U.S.
action, with the United States, Britain, and France vetoing the resolution; the
General Assembly favored condemnation by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-
eight.64
Despite this aftermath of condemnation in 1986, the evidence presented
in support of the August 20 raids is even less compelling than that proffered
by the Reagan Administration before launching the widely condemned Libya
bombing. At the time of the decision to strike Afghanistan and the Sudan, the
Clinton Administration did not have any direct evidence of bin Laden's
connection to the embassy bombings comparable to the alleged intercepts of
Libyan diplomatic cables in 1986. Nor did it have direct evidence that bin
Laden was responsible for a wave of very recent attacks on Americans and
was planning specific future attacks comparable to that proffered by
Ambassador Walters with respect to Libya in 1986. This type of showing
would seem necessary to illustrate an ongoing armed attack and thus raise a
claim of self-defense and not just reprisal. 5 Thus, the Libya experience
indicates that Reno's apparent objections to the August 20 missile strikes were
well-founded.
63. See Marian Nash Leigh, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Laws, 80 AM. J. INT'LL. 612,633-35 (1986).
64. See Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. 3. INT'L L. 177, 189 (1987). The Third World reaction was uniformly
negative, and even most Western European allies criticized the attack. See id. at 187-88. Scholars and
journalists have disputed the Reagan Administration's factual claims. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Target:
Quoddafi, N.Y. TIMES MAGAzINE, Feb. 22, 1987, at 1; Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoC. 287, 293 (1987) (Remarks by Francis A. Boyle).
65. The U.S. government pointed to two prior attacks in which bin Laden was apparently
implicated. Both occurred more than two years prior to the embassy bombings, as opposed to the Libya
situation, where the United States cited a series of attacks or thwarted attacks that took place within
weeks of the Berlin bombing. Nor did the Clinton White House allege that bin Laden's pattern of attacks
was corroborated by the police or intelligence agencies of other countries, as was alleged in 1986.
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Given the haste with which these attacks were launched, Reno's reported
hesitancy is even less surprising. The FBI investigation of bin Laden's
connection to the embassy bombings was at a preliminary stage with no firm
conclusions as of August 20.66 This clearly indicates that, at the time that the
missiles were launched, the United States did not have definitive proof that
bin Laden was behind the embassy bombings.
67
After the raids had taken place, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
claimed that the American intelligence community had "very specific
information about very specific threats with respect to very specific targets"
that bin Laden was planning to attack; his conclusions, however, were
disputed by American intelligence operatives. 68 Furthermore, although a
number of senators were reportedly impressed by the Administration's
evidence, one senior congressman said of the CIA briefing that there was
evidence of "a lot of suspicious activity, but nothing conclusive."69 That the
decision to attack was made by a very small group of advisors-which
included neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the FBI Director-heightens the
suspicion that the evidence was not sufficiently discussed even within the
American government. As James Woolsey, President Clinton's former CIA
Director, stated, "This should not be the kind of decision made only with three
or four people around you of a Cabinet-level who don't know an EMPTA
sample from their left foot."70 Woolsey's comment rings even truer today, as
nearly every U.S. claim regarding the Sudan factory has turned out to be false.
Meanwhile, the Administration has repeatedly smothered efforts to initiate a
Security Council investigation of the Sudan missile attack, apparently
claiming that the "credible" evidence supporting its position was sufficient.
7 1
Thus, the Clinton Administration ordered missile strikes based at most
on a reasonable suspicion that bin Laden ordered the embassy bombings, that
he was planning imminent attacks on other U.S. targets, and that the El Shifa
factory was producing or was about to produce chemical weapons for bin
Laden's operation. Can one country attack another on the basis of such
inferences and suspicions? Should international law permit such "self-
defensive" measures before all the facts are known?
Those who would use force against terrorists often rely on domestic law
analogies to argue their position. For instance, they argue that harboring
terrorists is the international equivalent of "aiding and abetting"; just as the
state may punish those who aid a crime, so may a nation that offers refuge or
other aid to terrorists be punished.72 However, this analogy, like others taken
66. See David S. Cloud & Frances A. McMorris, Suspects in Embassy Bombings Extradited to
U.S, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1998, at A12.
67. See Hersh, supra note 35, at 39.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. at 39.
70. Ian Brodie, America Insists Factory Was Gas Producer, TIMES (London), Sept. 3, 1998, at
17.
71. See Sudan's Plea for Inquiry is Spurned, FiN. TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at 4; UN:
Opening Debate on Draft Convention for Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism, M2 Presswire, Nov. 12,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16533025.
72. See Sofaer, supra note 22, at 103-05.
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from domestic law, is flawed if one only imports the domestic legal standards
into the international arena, and not its procedural and evidentiary safeguards.
Under domestic law, the state must provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt
before a jury can condemn the criminal to death or prison.
No country-not even the United States-should be able to attack
alleged terrorists or their facilities based on evidence far weaker than that
which we require for a domestic criminal conviction. Had the United States
indicted bin Laden for murder and the owner of the El Shifa factory for
conspiracy, the government would have had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that they were guilty of the alleged crimes. It is self-serving hypocrisy
for the United States to attack alleged terrorist facilities, violate other nations'
sovereignty, and kill innocent civilians, using evidence that would not suffice
to sustain a criminal prosecution.
The U.S. government and its academic supporters would likely respond
as follows. First, the world is a jungle, and even the ablest intelligence
agencies are not able to conduct the same kind of thorough criminal
investigation employed domestically.73  To impose domestic legal
requirements on the international order would therefore be ludicrous, despite
the use of domestic legal analogies when it serves proponents of force. But
recent history suggests that the coordinated effort of United States and other
intelligence agencies can obtain evidence that they believe will suffice to
convict terrorists in courts of law. Moreover, it is unclear why it should be
easier, in terms of evidentiary showings, to conduct missile strikes against
another country, destroy a pharmaceutical plant producing medicine for
people who desperately need it, and condemn innocent civilians to death, than
it is to put a common criminal behind bars. A determination of international
law standards must weigh, as we do domestically, the risk of harm both to the
international community and to individuals from erroneous, unilateral
judgments. The protection of innocent civilians and the prevention of
indiscriminate uses of force require that far greater caution be exercised in
deciding whether to conduct missile strikes against another country than in
determining whether to lock up a criminal. Mistaken judgments leading to
deprivations of liberty can be reversed; the political and physical
consequences of Tomahawk missile strikes generally' cannot. Even if a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is deemed unacceptably stringent, a
government should at least be required to have reasonable certainty and direct
evidence of wrongdoing before it attacks another country with missiles. In
domestic law 'that lesser, but still heavy, burden of proof has often been
referred to as "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," or "clear, cogent
and convincing" evidence, or simply "clear and convincing" evidence.74 None
of those standards were met in the case of Sudan. The evidence proffered by
73. See, e.g., David K. Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-
Defense, and State Responsibility, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 245, 313-14 (1991) (describing the mistaken
attack on Iran Air Flight 655 as an example of "scenario fulfillment" due to speedy decision-making and
difficulties in collecting evidence).
74. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,424,430 (1979).
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the Clinton Administration neither linked the Sudan factory to bin Laden nor
established that bin Laden was behind the embassy bombings. Indeed, in bin
Laden's case, law enforcement agencies gathered evidence for several months
after the August 20 raids, ultimately indicting the Saudi exile for his alleged
role in the embassy bombings.75 Why not at least wait until law enforcement
agencies determine that sufficient evidence exists to indict the alleged
terrorists?
The response to the "why not wait" question would undoubtedly focus
on the need for a "swift" response.76 According to the proponents of the use of
force, deterrence requires a swift response, and self-defense warrants
immediate action. However, some experts have questioned the deterrence
value of an immediate military response, and the risk of error and pretext do
not justify any deterrence value gained.77 If the alleged terrorists are planning
future attacks, these attacks can be uncovered and thwarted while law
enforcement officials gather the evidence. Furthermore, Administration
officials recognize that a forceful response to terrorism would likely provoke
terrorist retaliation. Thus, the Administration appears more interested in
long-term deterrence rather than immediate self-defense. The rule of law,
however, requires, at a minimum, that deterrence measures are taken only
after the facts are known.
B. International Investigation of Factual Dispute
The Clinton Administration also failed to disclose the evidence upon
which it relied in ordering the August20 strikes, nor will it allow any
international fact-finding or public discussion with regard to that evidence.
Thus, practically speaking, the U.S. government's handling of the evidence
supporting the Sudan and Afghanistan raids reflects less respect for
international law than its practice after the Libya and Baghdad attacks. In each
of those cases, the U.S. government presented some of its evidence to the
Security Council; in the case of Libya, the United States disclosed sensitive
intelligence data to the world community.
The United States's repeated refusal to allow a Security Council
investigation into the El Shifa factory missile attack illustrates the extreme
hubris of the Clinton Administration: since the United States already knows
75. See Davis S. Cloud, U.S. Prosecutors Charge bin Laden and Aide with Conspiracy in
Embassy Bombings, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1998, at A6.
76. See, e.g., Intoccia, supra note 64, at 200-01 (arguing that self-defense serves the dual
purpose of protecting the attacked state from immediate threats and deterring future acts of aggression);
Excerpts from Schultz's Address on International Terrorism, supra note 54, at 12 (same).
77. Indeed, as former CIA Director Woolsey testified, an effective military response is often
"at odds with its being prompt." Hearings on Counterterrorism Policy Before the Judiciary Committee
of the Senate, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA), available
in 1998 WL 564420.
78. See Richard Newman et al., American Fights Back Clinton Raises the Stakes in the War
Against Terrorism, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 31, 1998, at 38; Carla Anne Robbins & Thomas E.
Ricks, Striking Back: American Forces Hit Alleged Terrorist Bases in Afghanistan, Sudan, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
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all the facts, no purpose would be served by an international fact-finding. This
claim disturbs even those who strongly support the use of military force in
fighting terrorists.79 Moreover, the implications of the U.S. position for the
international legal order are deeply troubling.
In refusing to permit any international discussion of the Sudan raid, the
United States has rather boldly suggested that the international legal
community cannot competently evaluate the factual basis of its self-defense
claim. This is the first time the United States has made such a suggestion.
Even in Nicaragua v. United States, the United States recognized that the
Security Council remains responsible for dealing with uses of force; it argued
only that the International Court of Justice ought not to evaluate an ongoing
use of force.80 Now, the Administration claims that even the Security Council
ought not even to investigate the facts of a use of force already completed.
The United States's position appears to be that the factual premises of
unilateral uses of force are internationally unreviewable. "Trust us," the
government states, as if error were not possible. The effect of the U.S.
position is that any nation may attack another based on undisclosed facts not
subject to any international evaluation-unless we are arguing the untenable
position that the United States, but not other nations, can so act. We would
certainly oppose another nation's use of force based on such a principle. The
U.S. position provides virtually no legal restraint on the unilateral use of
force. Even if one agrees that the concept of self-defense should be interpreted
to allow nations to respond to terrorism, the requirements of international
order cry out for multilateral fact-finding. As former Ambassador Richard
Gardner has argued:
We need to develop international processes to find the facts .... The Security Council,
under Article 33 and subsequent articles, should be used to obtain the facts in disputed
situations, where claims of self-defense are made on one side and rebutted by the other.
Strengthening the Council's fact-finding capacity should be a major priority for Soviet,
American, and other international lawyers, and all persons concerned with collective
security .'
Professor Wedgwood argues that it is simply unrealistic for international law
to require that a nation share, in a multilateral, public forum, the information
on which a targeting decision has been based. 2 While a nation may politically
decide to make such information public, there are undoubtedly cases, as
Wedgwood suggests, when doing so would compromise intelligence sources
or render sources less valuable in the future.
8 3
Three arguments nonetheless compel the conclusion that a nation that
bombs another country in response to a terrorist attack is required to submit
79. See Sofaer, supra note 23.
80. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392,431-38 (Nov. 26).
81. Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE
NEW INTERNATONAL ORDER 49, 52-53 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
82. See Wedgwood, supra note 22, 567-68.
83. See id.
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such decisions-and the information upon which they are based-to
international review. First, international law narrowly, and in my view,
correctly, limits such decisions to compelling cases of urgent necessity. That a
nation is unwilling to subject its factual decision-making basis to international
scrutiny suggests that the military necessity of such action is dubious. In other
words, the requirement that a nation subject such decisions to international
review serves to ensure that those decisions are not made lightly. The Reagan
Administration's release of evidence to support its 1986 bombing of Libya
resulted in the disclosure of sensitive intelligence information, but such
disclosure was one of the costs of conducting those air strikes. International
law does impose some costs on a nation that uses force against another-one
of those legitimate costs involves the necessity of proving its claims to the
international community.84
Second, while in some cases a requirement of multilateral review may
involve some risk to intelligence sources, in many cases such review will not.
For example, in the Sudan case the United States could turn over the soil
sample it has for independent review (if the sample still exists); it could allow
independent experts access to the lab tests and to lab technicians that
evaluated that sample; and it could permit a multilateral investigation into
Mr. Idris's ties and what was being produced at the factory-all without any
disclosure of sensitive intelligence information. The reason why the United
States does not do so is because it is simply unwilling to submit to multilateral
review, not out of fear of damaging intelligence assets.
Finally, the alternative regime that Professor Wedgwood suggests is
unacceptable. Wedgwood's rule would be that a state can forcibly respond to
what it believes is another state's aid to terrorists based only on its political
determination as to whether it ought to explain its targeting decisions to the
world community. Wedgwood argues that "[t]he use of military force must be
tested by responsible decision-makers against a host of prudential
considerations."85 Thus, it turns out that the use of military force against
terrorism is governed by political, not legal, considerations. If every nation
can target another based on secret information that it need not legally share,
then the fundamental premise of the U.N. Charter prohibiting the use of force
is rendered meaningless. Thus, some sort of international review must be
required if one wants to preserve some meaningful legal restraints on the use
of force in the fight against terrorism. The issue involved in the August 20
missile attacks is therefore not merely the "merits of a particular decision,"
86
84. Wedgwood's analogy of the targeting of a manufacturing plant in Khartoum with a
targeting decision made during a war is inappropriate. See id. at 569-71. The decision to attack a
country with whom we are ostensibly at peace is fumdamentally different than a decision to attack an
enemy during a war. In the first case, the risk of error is that of initiating a war, of attacking another
country wrongfully; in the other, it is of making a tactical error within a war and possibly killing
innocent civilians. The Charter directly deals with the first problem and not with the second because the
basic interests of world order require that nations not start wars with other nations unless certain very
narrow exceptions apply. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
85. Wedgwood, supra note 22, at 563 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 569.
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as Professor Wedgwood argues, but the important principle of whether such
factually contested decisions ought to be subject to multilateral review. The
United States's expansive use of the concept of self-defense requires more
international fact-finding and oversight, not less. The international legal order
can restrain the unilateral use of force either by creating a clear legal standard
or by providing international oversight of claims of self-defense. If neither
option is available, the legal restraints on the use of force collapse.
V. MILITARY FORCE AS AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY
The legal justifications permitting nations to use force in response to
terrorist attacks are premised on the efficacy of such military strikes. The
proponents of strong and swift military responses to terrorist attacks argue that
force is needed as "an effective counterweight to extremism. '' 87 However, the
efficacy of such military strikes is as suspect as their legality. Many experts
note that these attacks do not deter terrorism, but result in an escalation of
terrorist violence and a spiraling cycle of retaliation.88 Officials in the United
States and abroad now believe that the attack on bin Laden's camp may have
backfired.89 A number of senior U.S. counter-terrorism officials claim that the
missiles inflicted very little lasting damage but helped to make bin Laden a
more popular figure in the Islamic world.90 Former CIA Director James
Woolsey has questioned whether targeting the camps, two of which are
supported by Pakistan, will ultimately damage our ability to cooperate closely
with Pakistani law enforcement agencies.9 1 Others, such as General Sir
Michael Rose, the former British commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia,
suggest that such strikes contribute to a "culture of violence" that invites more
terrorism.
92
The 1986 air strikes against Libya further underscore the dangers of
military retaliation. While many observers claim that Libyan-sponsored
terrorism declined after the U.S. Tripoli raid, the U.S. government concluded
otherwise. United States officials have determined that the destruction of Pan
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 was Libya's response to the
Tripoli raid, and that, in the words of a former counter-terrorism official, "we
[had] just set up the next round of terrorism."93 Thus, after the Lockerbie
87. Schultz, supra note 56, at 205.
88. See Eqbal Abroad, Missile Diplomacy: US Bombardment of Afghanistan, Sudan, NATION,
Sept. 21, 1998, at 29; Punish and Be Damned: The Perils of Over-Hasty Military Reaction, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 29, 1998, at 16; Serge Schemann, US. Fury on 2 Continents: Pros and Cons, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 1998, at All ("[E]xperts say, it is most likely that the targets of the action and their supporters
will lash back.").
89. See Tim Weiner, Missile Strikes Against bin Laden Won Him Esteem in Muslim Lands,
US. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A13.
90. See id.
91. See Hearings on Counterterrorism Policy Before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate,
supra note 77, at 11.
92. British General Launches Attack on "Violent" NATO, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 12,
1999, at 17.
93. Andrew Marshall, Strike First, Ask Questions Later; U.S. Policy Is Now to Hit Terrorists
Hard, Without Any Legal Niceties, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 30, 1998, at 13; see also Richard T.
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tragedy, the United States government shifted its strategy and focused on law
enforcement.
The de facto relaxation of Article 51 is both unnecessary and
counterproductive in the fight against terrorism. Besides weakening the
international legal restraints upon which the world order vitally depends, such
strategies reflect the erroneous view that complex political problems can be
solved by military force. This is certainly true when the military force used is
largely symbolic, as was the case in both the 1993 Baghdad bombing and the
1998 attack on Afghanistan; neither raid seriously damaged the target's
military capabilities. As President Clinton's former CIA Director Woolsey has
stated, "shooting cruise missiles at buildings, is not, on the whole, the best
way to deal with [terrorism]. 94 The combination of the serious risks both to
international order and innocent civilians posed by forceful responses to
terrorism, and the general inefficacy of forceful responses, mandates the
maintenance of strict legal rules and evidentiary standards to restrict such
unilateral uses of force.
VI. INTERNATIONAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE MISSILE STRIKES
The most curious aspect of the U.S. missile strikes of August 20, 1998 is
the virtual absence of international reaction. Most nations, including U.S.
NATO allies such as France, Italy, Britain, and Germany, appear to believe
that the United States attacked the wrong factory in Sudan. Surely, that belief
would make the attack on Sudan illegal. Nonetheless, when on August 20,
1998 the Security Council informally met and discussed Sudan's complaint
and the Arab League's call for an investigation,95 only the United States and
one other country spoke to the issue. To date, not one Security Council
member has taken up Sudan's call for an investigation, and the whole issue
seemingly has been dropped.
That the Security Council and the international community has
acquiesced in the U.S. missile attacks is not attributable to states' view that
the attacks were legal. For even if, as the French Foreign Minister noted,
America's allies are willing to condone unilateral attacks in certain
circumstances, "you must not get it wrong." 96 That most nations believe that
the United States probably did "get it wrong" in striking the El Shifa plant
means that they do not believe that the action was legal.
The lack of public protest and debate over the missile strikes can only be
explained by the general distaste for the Sudanese government coupled with a
disinclination to directly confront the United States. Sudan, unlike Iraq, has no
Newman et al., Clinton Raises the Stakes in the War Against Terrorism, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 31, 1998, at 38 ("[IThe bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 is widely believed to have been an
act of revenge for the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986.. ").
94. Hearings on Counterterrorism Policy Before the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, supra
note 77, at 11.
95. See Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary-General, Aug. 24, 1998,
available in <http://www.un.org> (library of Daily Press Briefings).
96. Lynch, supra note 34.
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vast oil reserves. The August 20 attack, unlike that on Iraq, has no strong
bearing on any significant economic or political interests that other
governments, such as Russia or France, have in the attacked country. The end
of the Cold War and the United States's position as the world's sole and
unchallenged superpower renders opposition to U.S. actions even more
difficult in the absence of some strong interests motivating other states. In
addition, other governments are reluctant to publicly accuse the United States
of lying, even if they believe a mistake was made. Finally, any direct
confrontation between the Security Council and the United States over the
missile strikes is certain to fail, as the United States has made it clear that it
will veto any resolution calling for an investigation into the attack. This is
therefore a situation where nations privately complain about what the United
States did, but officially remain silent--or at least do not protest noisily. Other
states are frustrated that the United States is able to disregard views that
contradict its position-a frustration that inevitably leads them to choose their
battles over the United States's unilateral use of force carefully. The Sudanese
missile strike cannot be a very appealing battle to wage.
Nor can other states' acquiescence in the Sudan and Afghanistan missile
strikes reflect the emergence of any new legal principle or expansion of self-
defense permitted by Article 51. No state, not even the United States, would
argue for a legal principle that permits states to use force predicated on
unilateral factual assertions based on undisclosed evidence.
Rather, the August 20 missile strikes represent the assertion of imperial
might and arrogance in opposition to international law. The attack
demonstrates that the United States has the power to block any effort to
question or challenge its factual assertions, and to, in effect, silence other
international voices.
But imperial hubris has its costs. The current Clinton Administration
policy to disregard the limits set by international law in dealing with such
nations as Iraq or Sudan can only have the long-run effect of undermining
respect for the U.N. Charter. The decade started with the United States
proudly proclaiming a new world order based on the U.N. Charter and
international law. It ends with a United States determined to use its power in
disregard of both international law and the views of other nations.
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